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THE PROBLEM WITH PRETEXT 
Lynn E. Blais* 
“It is a familiar principle of constitutional 
law that [the Supreme Court] will not 
strike down an otherwise constitutional 
statute on the basis of an alleged illicit 
legislative motive.”1 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kelo v. City of New Lon-
don2 in September of 2004, many thought it signaled the Court’s interest in 
recognizing a limiting principle inherent in the public use requirement that 
would rein in the expansive assertion of eminent domain powers by state 
and local governments undertaking economic development projects.3  The 
 
* Professor Blais is the Leroy G. Denman Professor of Real Property Law at the University 
of Texas School of Law.  She would like to thank the editors of the Fordham Urban Law 
Journal for sponsoring this interesting symposium, and the symposium participants for their 
insights and observations on the problem of pretext. 
 1. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). 
 2. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 3. See, e.g., Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London:  
An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
491, 495-96 (2006) (“The Court’s writ, coming as it did in the wake of several high-profile 
decisions from state supreme courts and lower federal courts employing unusually hard-
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Kelo case starkly revealed the vulnerability of private landowners to the 
seemingly unfettered authority of local officials to condemn private proper-
ty for what appeared to be mostly private gain.  The petitioners in Kelo 
were homeowners, neighbors, and ordinary folks like you and me—only 
more so.  One of the petitioners, Wilhelmina Dery, had been born in her 
home in New London nearly ninety years before, and all of the petitioners 
had “poured their labor and their love into their homes.”4  Yet the City of 
New London planned to take these homes against the owners’ wishes so 
that Pfizer and other private companies could use the property for their own 
private development purposes.5  If any case provided a perfect vehicle for 
the Court to announce that the Fifth Amendment had some teeth, this 
seemed surely to be it. 
Alas, it was not to be.  In the end, the Kelo Court said mostly what it had 
been saying all along, namely, that the concept of public use was expansive 
and encompassed projects undertaken purely for economic development 
purposes, and that the judiciary had little role in policing the legislature’s 
determination that a proposed use satisfied the public use requirement.6  
But the Court did introduce a new idea into the mix.  It suggested that if the 
legislature was asserting a public purpose for the taking of private property 
as a “mere pretext,” and the true purpose for the taking was to bestow a 
private benefit, then that condemnation would violate the public use re-
quirement.7 
This Article addresses the problem with pretext.  Part I contains a brief 
history of the public use requirement and the Kelo Court’s rejection of the 
claim that economic development does not constitute a public use.  Part II 
summarizes the widespread but essentially ineffectual political fallout from 
Kelo and the consequent return of public use challenges to the courts.  Part 
III explores the argument that pretext may serve as a limiting principle in 
public use cases.  Lastly, Part IV explains the problem with pretext. 
 
nosed approaches to questions of public use, led some to believe that the Court was about to 
announce a new, tighter standard for judicial review of public use determinations.”). 
 4. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) 
(No. 04-108), 2004 WL 1659558 at *1, *2. 
 5. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473. 
 6. See id. at 481-83. 
 7. See id. at 478. 
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I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF PUBLIC USE, INCLUDING KELO 
By the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court had long made clear 
its unwillingness to second-guess legislative determinations of public use.8  
That judicial restraint was tested and solidified in the wake of the urban re-
newal renaissance that followed World War II.9  In Berman v. Parker,10 
which upheld the condemnation of a profitable business as part of a sweep-
ing urban renewal plan for the District of Columbia in 1954, the Court em-
phasized that “the concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive,” 
and “within the power of the legislature to determine. . . .”11  Thus, accord-
ing to the Court, “when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has 
been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive” and “[t]he role of the judi-
ciary in determining whether that power is being exercised for a public 
purpose is an extremely narrow one.”12  In Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff,13 the Court reiterated its unwillingness to substitute the judiciary’s 
views of public use for those of the legislature, and embraced an extraordi-
narily deferential version of rational basis review for claims that a proposed 
use did not satisfy the public use requirement.14  The Midkiff Court said 
that “deference to a legislature’s ‘public use’ determination is required ‘un-
til it is shown to involve an impossibility’”15 and “the Court . . . will not 
substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes 
public use ‘unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.’”16 
After Midkiff, it was clear that the Public Use Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution would not impose a significant impediment to state and local efforts 
to condemn private property.17  The Court had made clear that public use is 
a concept broad enough to embrace a wide range of public purposes, and 
that courts should apply extreme deference to any legislative determination 
that a particular use serves a public purpose.  As a consequence, urban revi-
 
 8. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 508-10 (discussing the development of public use juri-
sprudence in the early twentieth century). 
 9. For a brief history of urban renewal in the United States, see Lynn E. Blais, Urban 
Revitalization in the post-Kelo Era, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 657, 676-81 (2007). 
 10. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 11. Id. at 33. 
 12. Id. at 32. 
 13. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 14. Id. at 240-42. 
 15. Id. at 240 (quoting Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925)). 
 16. Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 
(1896)). 
 17. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 
61, 61 (1986) (“In practice . . . most observers today think that the public use limitation is a 
dead letter.”). 
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talization efforts intensified.  Public-private redevelopment partnerships, 
which had long been used for urban renewal purposes, became even more 
popular, and the scope of redevelopment projects expanded beyond slum 
clearance and urban renewal to urban revitalization and redevelopment.18 
In light of this extraordinarily deferential judicial review in federal 
courts, property owners looked to state constitutions to fill the perceived 
gap left by Berman and Midkiff.  In a series of influential decisions, several 
state supreme courts responded by interpreting state constitutions to de-
mand heightened judicial scrutiny of public use determinations, at least 
when private property was being condemned for economic development 
purposes or for transfer to other private parties.19 
The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Kelo suggested that the Court 
was poised to revisit its public use holdings in light of the proliferation of 
condemnations in public-private urban redevelopment projects and the 
skepticism of state courts about those condemnations.20  Some scholars ex-
pressed cautious optimism that the Court would finally discern limitations 
on condemnation authority in the Public Use Clause.21  But the decision in 
Kelo proved a huge disappointment to those who thought the Court would, 
and should, recognize constitutional limits on the power to condemn prop-
erty for economic development.22 
Instead of reining in the breadth of prior public use jurisprudence, the 
Kelo decision powerfully reaffirmed its prior broad interpretation of the 
Public Use Clause in two important ways.  First, the Court reaffirmed its 
 
 18. See Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 550-52 (2009) (describ-
ing the historical and current practice of permitting private condemnation by private redeve-
lopment companies and other government-mediated private takings); see also Amy Lavine, 
Urban Renewal and the Story of Berman v. Parker, 42 URB. LAW. 423, 423-24 (2010). 
 19. See, e.g., Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl. L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002); 
Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004); Ga. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jasper 
Cnty., 586 S.E.2d 853 (S.C. 2003).  For a discussion of some of these cases, see David A. 
Dana, Exclusionary Eminent Domain, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 7, 19 & n.31 (2009). 
 20. See, e.g., Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).  For a com-
prehensive survey of the outcome of cases involving public use challenges between 1954 
and 1986, see Merrill, supra note 17, at 94-116. See also Bell, supra note 18, at 550-51 (dis-
cussing state court cases striking down public-private condemnations). 
 21. See, e.g., James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 859, 860 (“So, however unexpectedly, the subject of public use is back on the table, 
with a good chance of substantial change in the law across the country.”). 
 22. It should be noted that this group was not limited to traditional private property 
rights advocates and conservative political think-tanks.  For an example of the disappointed 
reaction to Kelo, see Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response 
to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2108-14 (2009) (documenting the “widespread outrage” 
that followed Kelo and “cut across partisan, ideological, racial, and gender lines”) [hereinaf-
ter Somin, Limits of Backlash]. 
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longstanding holding that the concept of public use is expansive and ac-
commodates the reality that “the needs of society have varied between dif-
ferent parts of the Nation, just as they have evolved over time in response 
to changed circumstances.”23  Second, the Court re-emphasized the prima-
cy of the legislative role in determining public use, and affirmed the ex-
traordinary degree of deference to which these legislative determinations 
are entitled.24  The Court grounded both of these conclusions in “more than 
a century [of] public use jurisprudence,” thus suggesting that the trend lines 
were long and not likely to deviate.25 
Nevertheless, Kelo was not a total loss.  The Court took pains to em-
phasize the federalism aspects of the decision, pointing out that the Federal 
Constitution is not the only, nor the most obvious, place where limits on the 
power to use eminent domain can be found.26  The Court suggested that 
other—more appropriate—sources of limitations on this power are state 
constitutions and state statutes.27  Moreover, the Court implied that the 
Federal Constitution remained an important constraint on “pretextual” con-
demnations—that is, condemnations that were said to be for a public pur-
pose but were really intended to benefit private parties.28  Justice Kennedy 
made this point more directly in his concurrence.  According to Justice 
Kennedy, “[t]he determination that a rational-basis standard of review is 
appropriate does not, however, alter the fact that transfers intended to con-
fer benefits on particular, favored private entities, and with only incidental 
or pretextual public benefits, are forbidden by the Public Use Clause.”29 
Thus, Kelo could be read to represent the end of public use claims.  The 
Kelo Court seemed intent on closing the federal courthouse doors to public 
use challenges and pointed the way to other avenues for seeking relief from 
the expansive exercise of eminent domain (that is, state referenda, state leg-
islatures, and state courts).30  At the same time, however, the Court ap-
 
 23. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482 (2005). 
 24. See id. (“For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed 
rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in de-
termining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.”). 
 25. See id. at 483. 
 26. See id. at 482 (“Our earliest cases in particular embodied a strong theme of federal-
ism, emphasizing the ‘great respect’ that we owe to state legislatures and state courts in dis-
cerning local public needs.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 27. See id. at 489 (“We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from 
placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”). 
 28. See id. at 478 (“Nor would the City be allowed to take property under the mere pre-
text of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.”). 
 29. Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 30. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
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peared to suggest that there was one more chapter to public use claims—a 
chapter in which pretext plays a leading role. 
II.  THE KELO AFTERMATH 
The public response to Kelo was immediate and powerful, and it played 
out in the state arenas identified in the Kelo decision as being the appropri-
ate fora for relief.  The political fallout from Kelo has been well docu-
mented, most recently and thoroughly by Professor Ilya Somin, another 
participant in this symposium,31 and there is no need for this Article to re-
tread that ground.32  As Professor Somin demonstrates, the Kelo decision 
was followed by widespread public outrage that encouraged private proper-
ty rights advocates to seek political solutions to the problems of excessive 
economic development condemnations.33  This outrage fostered a remarka-
ble measure of success, at least by one measure: In just a few years, a large 
majority of states adopted statutes or amended their constitutions to limit 
the exercise of eminent domain.34  As Professor Somin observes, “[t]he Ke-
lo backlash probably resulted in more new state legislation than any other 
Supreme Court decision in history.”35 
Unfortunately, the political victories proved almost as disappointing as 
Kelo itself.  Almost across the board, the eminent domain reforms fail to 
impose meaningful limitations on the use of eminent domain for economic 
development.36  The predominant deficiency in the recently adopted limita-
tions on the use of eminent domain for economic development is the wide-
spread inclusion of an exception for blight.37  These exceptions are exacer-
bated by the absence of meaningful limiting definitions for blight 
designations.38 
 
 31. See Ilya Somin, Let There Be Blight: Blight Condemnations in New York After 
Goldstein and Kaur, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2011). 
 32. See Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 22; see also Blais, supra note 9, at 671-
76. 
 33. See Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 22, at 2108-14. 
 34. Id. at 2120 (“As of early 2009, thirty-six state legislatures have enacted post-Kelo 
reforms.”). 
 35. Id. at 2102. 
 36. Id. at 2114. 
 37. Id. at 2120-31 (detailing the blight exceptions). 
 38. See Judge Harold L. Lowenstein, Redevelopment Condemnations:  A Blight or a 
Blessing Upon the Land?, 74 MO. L. REV. 301, 302 (2009) (“Despite widespread eminent 
domain reform legislation, redevelopment statutes in almost every state retain a loophole–
indeed, a legislative backdoor–to condemnation for economic development in permitting 
condemnation to eradicate blight.  Given that most states define blight in vague and general 
terms, a finding of blight with regard to a redevelopment area is little more than a procedur-
al hurdle for the developer to overcome.”); see also James W. Ely, Jr., Post-Kelo Reform:  
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Goldstein39 and Kaur,40 the two cases that inspired this symposium, 
starkly reveal the potential for broad, deferential interpretations of blight to 
eviscerate statutory and constitutional limits on the exercise of eminent 
domain.  Both Goldstein and Kaur involved challenges to high profile pub-
lic-private redevelopment projects in New York City in which the lan-
downers claimed that their property did not satisfy the state constitution’s 
equivalent of a blight standard.  In Goldstein, the landowner challenged the 
Atlantic Yards Arena and Redevelopment Project—developer Bruce Ratn-
er’s efforts to condemn more than twenty-two acres in Brooklyn to build 
residential, retail, and office buildings as well as a new arena for the New 
Jersey Nets.41  Kaur involved another massive public-private initiative, in 
which Columbia University sought the help of the Empire State Develop-
ment Corporation (in particular its eminent domain powers) to acquire se-
venteen acres of land in the Manhattanville section of New York City for 
the construction of a new urban campus.42 
Article XVIII, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution was 
adopted in 1938, in response to “the dire circumstances of urban slum 
dwelling,”43 to authorize the state legislature to empower public corpora-
tions to condemn “substandard and insanitary areas”44 and provide for the 
clearance, reconstruction, and rehabilitation of those areas.45  At issue in 
Goldstein and Kaur was whether the threshold of “substandard and insani-
tary”46 imposed an independent substantive limitation on the State’s emi-
nent domain power that could be enforced in the courts.  The answer, it 
turns out, is no. 
In Goldstein, the New York Court of Appeals embraced a broad and 
evolving understanding of the concept of “substandard and insanitary”47 
and emphasized that “lending precise content to these general terms has not 
been, and may not be, primarily a judicial exercise.”48  Rather, the court 
said, “[w]hether a matter should be the subject of a public undertaking–
 
Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty?, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 127, 135 (2009); David S. 
Yellin, Note, Masters of Their Own Eminent Domain:  The Case for a Reliance Interest As-
sociated with Economic Development Takings, 99 GEO. L.J. 651, 659-60 (2011). 
 39. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009). 
 40. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub 
nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 41. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 165-66. 
 42. Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 724-25. 
 43. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 171. 
 44. N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 172. 
BLAIS_CHRISTENSEN 6/7/2011  7:00 PM 
970 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVIII 
whether its pursuit will serve a public purpose or use–is ordinarily the 
province of the Legislature” and “[i]t is only where there is no room for 
reasonable difference of opinion as to whether an area is blighted, that 
judges may substitute their views . . . for those of the legislatively designat-
ed agency.”49  Less than one year later the court reaffirmed this stance in 
Kaur.50 
The battle over blight in New York City mirrors conflicts in many other 
jurisdictions, many of which have seen similar outcomes.51  Having incor-
porated blight exceptions into their post-Kelo reforms, in many states those 
exceptions are so broad that they threaten to eviscerate the heart of the 
reform.52  Landowners who cannot rely on challenges to blight designa-
tions to constrain the use of eminent domain power for public-private rede-
velopment are now reaching for the remaining lifeline offered by Kelo–the 
power of pretext–to invalidate an attempt to take private property for an 
otherwise public use. 
III.  THE POWER OF PRETEXT? 
In light of the limited effectiveness of most of the political responses to 
Kelo, the focus of attempts to constrain local eminent domain authority has 
turned back to the Federal Constitution.  In particular, property owners and 
their advocates have seized on the pretext language of Kelo53 and, more 
importantly, of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence,54 to locate meaningful lim-
its on the power of state and local governments to use eminent domain for 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 730-31 (N.Y. 2010), cert. 
denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 51. See e.g., City of Parker v. State, 992 So.2d 171, 177-79 (Fla. 2008) (adopting a 
broad and deferential interpretation of the Florida blight statute); City of Las Vegas Down-
town Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 11-12 (Nev. 2003) (adopting an expan-
sive interpretation of blight); see also Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, 
Economic Development, and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 
320-23 (2004) (discussing the wide latitude that local governments have to define or deter-
mine blight). But see Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc., v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 
460 (N.J. 2007) (rejecting an interpretation of “blight” that embraces property that is merely 
underutilized). 
 52. Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 22, at 2120-37. 
 53. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005) (“Nor would the City be 
allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose . . . .”). 
 54. See id. at 491 (Kennedy J., concurring) (“A court applying a rational-basis review 
under the Public Use Clause should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is in-
tended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public justifica-
tions.”). 
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economic development purposes.  In my view, the Public Use Clause of the 
Federal Constitution is not up to the task of restricting eminent domain.55 
A. The Origins of Pretext in Eminent Domain 
The Kelo Court did not invent the concept of pretext as a potential limit-
ing principle in eminent domain cases.  Rather, the concern about pretext in 
eminent domain law was first raised in a Supreme Court opinion in 1848, 
in Justice Woodbury’s concurrence in West River Bridge Co. v. Dix.56  In 
West River Bridge Co., the Court rejected the claim that the exercise of 
eminent domain over a previously granted franchise to operate a toll bridge 
constituted an unconstitutional impairment of contract.57  Rather, the Court 
held that the franchise stood in the same position as title to real property—
both were subject to the eminent domain power of the state.58  In a separate 
opinion, Justice Woodbury concurred in this result, but expressed a pletho-
ra of concerns about the reach of the eminent domain power, many of 
which presage contemporary debates.59  In particular, Justice Woodbury 
was the first to express doubt as to the constitutionality of an exercise of 
eminent domain—even if the property was to be used for an otherwise va-
lid public purpose—if the condemnation had been motivated by bad faith 
or pretext.  In particular, he noted: 
Finally, I do not agree that even this franchise, as property, can be taken 
from this corporation without violating the contract with it, unless the 
measure was honest, bonâ fide, and really required for what it professed 
to be, beside being, as before remarked, proper, on account of the locality 
and nature of this property, to be condemned for this purpose.60 
Although Justice Woodbury conceded that the legislature is the best 
judge of public purpose, and that for the most part the Court should defer to 
 
 55. For a thorough exposition of the opposing case and an argument that courts should 
adopt a “process scrutiny” approach for evaluating pretext claims, see Daniel S. Hafetz, 
Note, Ferreting Out Favoritism: Bringing Pretext Claims After Kelo, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3095 (2009). 
 56. 47 U.S. 507 (1848).  This is the first time this author could find such a concern 
raised. 
 57. Id. at 536. 
 58. Id. at 534. 
 59. See, e.g., id. at 546-48 (Woodbury, J., concurring) (“But when we go to other public 
uses, not so urgent, not connected with precise localities, not difficult to be provided for 
without this power of eminent domain, and in places where it would be only convenient, but 
not necessary, I entertain strong doubts of its applicability. Who ever heard of laws to con-
demn private property for public use, for a marine hospital or state prison?”). 
 60. Id. at 548. 
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a legislative determination of public use, he suggested that in certain cir-
cumstances courts should probe more deeply: 
And though I agree, that, for most cases and purposes, the public authori-
ties in a State are the suitable judges as to this point, and that the judiciary 
only decide if their laws are constitutional; that the legislature generally 
acts for the public in this; that road agents are their agents, under this limi-
tation; yet I am not prepared to agree, that if, on the face of the whole 
proceedings,-the law, the report of commissioners, and the doings of the 
courts,-it is manifest that the object was not legitimate, or that illegal in-
tentions were covered up in forms, or the whole proceedings a mere “pre-
text,” our duty would require us to uphold them.61 
This expression of concern for the motives and intentions underlying con-
demnation decisions appears to directly track Justice Kennedy’s observa-
tions in Kelo. 
Nevertheless, for the one hundred fifty years between West River Bridge 
Co. and Kelo, the concern for pretextual motive lay dormant and the con-
cern for pretext could only be seen in other forms.  Following West River 
Bridge Co., the concept of pretext next arose in eminent domain cases in 
the context of the government’s attempt to deny the legal consequence of 
its actions, rather than the motives behind those actions.  The flooding cas-
es—which were a precursor to modern regulatory takings jurispru-
dence62—raised the question of when, if ever, governmental interference 
with the use of private property constitutes a compensable taking.  In Pum-
pelly v. Green Bay Co.,63 the landowner asserted a claim for compensation 
under the Takings Clause after the Green Bay and Mississippi Canal Com-
pany (“Canal Company”) built a dam that flooded six hundred forty acres 
of his land.64  The Canal Company resisted the compensation claim on the 
grounds that there had been no “taking” of Pumpelly’s property—for pub-
lic use or otherwise.65  Rather, the Canal Company argued, the damage was 
merely the consequential result of a valid governmental action and there-
fore was not compensable.66  Although the Supreme Court was interpreting 
the Wisconsin Constitution (because the Fifth Amendment had not yet been 
 
 61. Id. (citations omitted). 
 62. For a discussion of how the flooding cases established one of the three factors rele-
vant to modern regulatory takings doctrine, see Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 
1083-86 (1993). 
 63. 80 U.S. 166 (1871). 
 64. Id. at 167. 
 65. Id. at 177. 
 66. Id. 
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incorporated against the states),67 the takings prohibitions were almost 
identical in the U.S. and Wisconsin Constitutions,68 and the Court rejected 
the Canal Company’s attempt to find shelter in the semantics of the Tak-
ings Clause: 
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if . . . it shall be held 
that if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real prop-
erty to the uses of the public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict ir-
reparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to 
total destruction without making any compensation, because, in the nar-
rowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the public use. Such a con-
struction would pervert the constitutional provision into a restriction upon 
the rights of the citizen . . . instead of the government, and make it an au-
thority for invasion of private right under the pretext of the public 
good . . . .69 
This quote, which makes clear that the government cannot evade its ob-
ligation to compensate landowners for the destruction of their property by 
denying that the destruction constitutes a taking, is repeated often in subse-
quent years.70  It appears, however, to be the only context in which pretext 
is mentioned in eminent domain cases until Kelo.  Thus, although pretext as 
motive appeared very early in the jurisprudence of eminent domain, it did 
not resurface in future cases until it reappeared in Kelo a century and a half 
later. 
B. Pretext in its Contemporary Form—Kelo 
The reincarnation of pretext as motive in eminent domain jurisprudence 
occurred in a short aside in the majority opinion in Kelo.  Explicating the 
polar propositions of the public use requirement, the Kelo Court explained 
that the sovereign may not take property from one person to transfer it to 
another for the sole purpose of conveying a private benefit on the second 
party; however, it may take private property from one party and transfer it 
 
 67. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was incorporated against the states in 
1897. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238-41 
(1897). 
 68. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V, with WIS. CONST. art. I, § 13. See also Pumpelly, 
80 U.S. at 177 (“The Constitution of Wisconsin . . . has a provision almost identical in lan-
guage . . . .”). 
 69. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 177-78. 
 70. See, e.g., United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 469-70 (1903) (“It is clear from 
these authorities that where the government by the construction of a dam or other public 
works so floods lands belonging to an individual as to substantially destroy their value there 
is a taking within the scope of the 5th Amendment.”). 
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to another if the purpose is for use by the public.71  In clarifying the first 
pole, the Court elaborated, “[n]or would the [sovereign] be allowed to take 
property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual pur-
pose was to bestow a private benefit.”72 
Justice Kennedy devoted more attention to the role of pretext in his con-
currence in Kelo, discussing both the process and the substance of a pretext 
claim.  Regarding the process of judicial review, Justice Kennedy said that 
a “plausible accusation” of “impermissible favoritism to private parties” 
triggers an obligation to “treat the objection as a serious one and review the 
record to see if it has merit. . . .”73  Substantively, the claim is to be re-
viewed under a rational basis standard.74  Thus, 
[a] court applying rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause 
should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a 
particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, 
just as a court applying rational-basis review under the Equal Protection 
Clause must strike down a government classification that is clearly in-
tended to injure a particular class of private parties, with only incidental 
or pretextual public justifications.75 
Both the majority and Justice Kennedy in his concurrence readily agreed 
that there was no credible evidence of pretext in Kelo itself.76 
IV.  THE PROBLEM WITH PRETEXT 
Kaur is not the only case in which a landowner has seized on Kelo’s pre-
text language to challenge a proposed condemnation.77  Indeed, given the 
limited options for objecting to the exercise of eminent domain after Kelo, 
and the generally ineffectual state reforms enacted in reponse to Kelo, a 
pretext challenge may be the primary defense for many landowners against 
public-private redevelopment projects.  This Part evaluates the suitability 
of the pretext inquiry for providing substance to the public use requirement, 
and concludes that the concept of pretext is inadequate in providing such 
substance. 
 
 71. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478-79 (2005). 
 72. Id. at 478. 
 73. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. at 478 (majority); id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 77. See, e.g., Franco v. Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160 (D.C. 2007); 
Cnty. of Haw. v. C & J Coupe Family Ltd. P’ship, 198 P.3d 615 (Haw. 2008). 
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A. Unconstitutional Motive 
Although the Supreme Court is fond of saying that motives do not mat-
ter in constitutional adjudication—the quote from United States v. 
O’Brien78 that opened this Article is but one of many in which the Court 
eschews a judicial role in examining legislative motives79—in reality, mo-
tives matter.80  Several scholars have argued that concern for illicit motives 
is the driving force behind some of our most fundamental constitutional sa-
feguards.81  It is beyond the scope of this short symposium piece to fully 
explore the various roles that motive plays in constitutional law.  But it will 
be helpful to our consideration of pretext to outline several circumstances 
in which the Supreme Court appears to employ various methodologies of 
judicial review to invalidate government actions animated by impermissi-
ble legislative motives. 
The challenges of motive-based constitutional analysis are daunting.  
Since many governmental actions are the product of multiple decision 
makers, one must decide whether to inquire into the individual motivations 
of each decision maker or the motive underlying the legislation as a whole.  
If individual motive is the relevant factor, then whose individual motive 
counts and what should we make of the multifarious motives that are most 
likely to account for any particular legislative decision?  The alternative is 
to consider the motive of the decision-making body as a whole.  But this 
raises more problems than it solves.  Collective or institutional motive is at 
best a difficult concept to define; in fact, it may not even be a comprehens-
ible concept.  Moreover, even if we could develop a coherent concept of 
collective bias, problems of proof would abound.82 
Nonetheless, it is relatively well settled that many constitutional safe-
guards implicate constraints on illicit motive and that “[t]he nature of tiered 
scrutiny, whether strict or lax, is assessment of the government’s objective 
and the relationship of its chosen means to accomplish that objective.”83  
 
 78. 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). 
 79. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (suggesting that “the mo-
tive or purpose behind a law” simply is not “relevant to [the law’s] constitutionality”). 
 80. See Gordon G. Young, Justifying Motive Analysis in Judicial Review, 17 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 191 (2008). 
 81. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental 
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996); Calvin Massey, The 
Role of Governmental Purpose in Constitutional Judicial Review, 59 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2007); 
Young, supra note 80, at 195 n.12 (listing some of the more influential articles addressing 
motive in constitutional law). 
 82. See Kagan, supra note 81, at 438 (discussing the impediments to discerning go-
vernmental motive). 
 83. Massey, supra note 81, at 17. 
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For example, Justice Kagan, writing fifteen years ago as Professor Kagan, 
has argued that “First Amendment law . . . has as its primary, though un-
stated, object the discovery of improper governmental motives.”84  Kagan 
argues that the general divide between content-neutral and content-based 
restrictions on speech reflects the use of content-based restrictions as a 
proxy for impermissible motive.85  In general, the Court imposes strict 
scrutiny on content-based restrictions as a mechanism for ensuring that 
something other than illicit motive justifies the restriction.86  In practice, 
the government can rarely overcome the presumption of illicit motive that 
is triggered by the use of content-based restrictions.87  Similarly, equal pro-
tection analysis employs suspect classifications as a threshold for the impo-
sition of rigorous judicial scrutiny, and strict scrutiny follows the implica-
tion of a fundamental right in substantive due process analysis.88  As in the 
First Amendment context, governmental actions that trigger strict scrutiny 
are almost always invalidated.89 
B. Pretext and Public Use 
If pretext is to have a role in public use challenges, it would most logi-
cally follow the structure of tiered review employed by the Supreme Court 
in other contexts in which motive matters.  Unfortunately, that structure 
does not map well onto the pretext inquiry for two reasons.  First, it is not 
clear what factor should be used to trigger heightened scrutiny.  Second, 
none of the tiers of heightened scrutiny currently employed by the Court 
suits the type of inquiry that is required in the public use context. 
Each of the constitutional inquiries above begins with a trigger.  In the 
context of equal protection law, strict scrutiny is triggered by a suspect 
classification; for substantive due process claims, heightened scrutiny is 
triggered by the interference with a fundamental right.90  Under the First 
 
 84. Kagan, supra note 81, at 414. 
 85. See id. at 443-57. 
 86. Id. at 451. 
 87. Id. at 455. 
 88. Massey, supra note 81, at 17-18. 
 89. See Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 UNIV. ILL. L. 
REV. 145, 155 (“[Strict scrutiny] has long been viewed as ‘strict in theory and fatal in 
fact.’”) (quoting Gerald Gunther, Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)). 
 90. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (“[A]ll racial clas-
sifications reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized.”); Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-57 (1973) (recognizing that the right of privacy is a fundamen-
tal right and thus laws attempting to limit that right must be narrowly drawn to satisfy a 
compelling state interest). 
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Amendment, the Court is more wary, and will scrutinize more closely, re-
strictions on speech that are not content-neutral.91  In order to import a 
heightened scrutiny test into takings law, we would need to identify an ap-
propriate trigger.  The Court has already rejected the use of economic de-
velopment and public-private partnerships as the threshold for invoking 
heightened scrutiny.92  That, after all, is what Kelo was all about.  If those 
two facts are not sufficient to warrant a presumption of pretext, it is not ob-
vious what other trigger would. 
Moreover, as noted above, the threshold identified in each context as in-
dicating the likely presence of improper motive, triggers scrutiny so rigor-
ous that few governmental actions can survive the review.93  Few advocates 
of heightened scrutiny in the public use context suggest the application of 
scrutiny that searching.  The most plausible candidate for the appropriate 
standard of review would be something like the intermediate scrutiny ap-
plied to “quasi-suspect,” gender-based classifications.  Under this standard, 
such classifications will be invalidated unless the government can show 
“that they serve important governmental objectives and . . . [that they are] 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”94  In fact, one of 
the tests adopted in state courts in the context of pretext challenges closely 
mirrors intermediate scrutiny.95 
Courts and scholars have offered several different standards for evaluat-
ing pretext challenges, and they can be grouped roughly into three catego-
ries: the burden-shifting motives test,96 the sufficiency of the plan test,97 
and the benefits to the public test.98  The benefits to the public test most 
closely resembles tests used by the Supreme Court in other intermediate 
scrutiny contexts.  I will consider each test in turn. 
The burden-shifting motives test is best illustrated by the decisions of 
the Hawaii Supreme Court in a protracted dispute between the County of 
Hawaii and the C&J Coupe Family Partnership, which resulted in two opi-
 
 91. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992). 
 92. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488 (2005) (“The disadvantages of 
a heightened form of review are especially pronounced in this case.”). 
 93. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 94. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190, 197 (1976)). 
 95. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Mich. 1981). 
 96. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as Public Use?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443 (2007). 
 97. See Cnty. of Haw. v. C & J Coupe Family Ltd. P’Ship, 198 P.3d 615, 648 (Haw. 
2008) [hereinafter Coupe I] (remanding for consideration of the landowner’s evidence of 
pretextual motive); Cnty. of Haw. v. C & J Coupe Family Ltd. P’Ship, 242 P.3d 1136, 1150 
(Haw. 2010) [hereinafter Coupe II] (rejecting the landowner’s claim of pretext). 
 98. Franco v. Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 173-74 (D.C. 2007). 
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nions from the Hawaii Supreme Court.99  In the Coupe cases, the landown-
er challenged the county’s decision to condemn his property in order to 
permit a private developer to construct a bypass highway, and connect its 
new development to the public highway.100  The county had determined 
that the bypass was necessary to “alleviate unacceptable and unsafe traffic 
conditions.”101  The landowner disputed that finding, claiming that the by-
pass was intended to confer a private benefit on the developer, and the 
proffered public purpose was a mere pretext.102  In Coupe I, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court explained that “legislative findings and declarations of pub-
lic use” are accorded “great weight” and are entitled to “prima facie accep-
tance of [the determination’s] correctness.”103  Once the presumption of 
public use attaches, the burden rests on the landowner, who must show that 
the public purpose asserted in the findings or declarations was “mere pre-
text,” and the “actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.”104  The 
court remanded the case for “an express determination by the court of 
whether the asserted public purpose was pretextual.”105  In Coupe II, the 
court rejected all of the landowner’s arguments in support of its claim of 
pretext.106 
This test appears to be modeled after the burden shifting motives test 
employed in Batson claims and Title VII disproportionate impact cases.107  
Batson v. Kentucky108 involved an equal protection challenge to alleged ra-
cial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory jury strikes.  Motives are 
central to the resolution of Batson claims, because the nature of a peremp-
tory challenge is that it entitles prosecutors to strike jurors for any reason at 
all, except for a reason that would violate the Equal Protection Clause.109  
Thus, a successful Batson claim requires a showing of “purposeful discrim-
 
 99. See Coupe I, 198 P.3d 615; Coupe II, 242 P.3d 1136.  The Hawaii Supreme Court 
heard this case twice.  The first time, in 2008, it remanded the case and the second time, in 
2010, it reached a decision. See supra note 97. 
 100. Coupe I, 198 P.3d at 620. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 637. 
 103. Id. at 637-38. 
 104. Id. at 642 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Ajimine, 39 Haw. 543, 550 (1952)). 
 105. Id. at 653. 
 106. Coupe II, 242 P.3d 1136, 1149-58 (Haw. 2010). 
 107. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 108. 476 U.S. 79. 
 109. See id. at 89 (“Although a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise permitted pe-
remptory challenges for any reason at all . . . the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prose-
cutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race . . . .”) (internal quotations 
and alteration omitted). 
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ination.”110  In Batson, the Court adopted a burden shifting test that takes 
into account the difficulty of demonstrating the requisite invidious mo-
tive.111  Under this test, the criminal defendant raising the Batson challenge 
can establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing 
that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, that the prosecutor has 
used his peremptory challenges to remove from the jury panel members of 
this group, and that other circumstantial evidence exists that raises an infe-
rence that race was a motivating factor.112  In this context, the defendant “is 
entitled to rely on the fact . . . that peremptory challenges constitute a jury 
selection practice that permits ‘those to discriminate who are of a mind to 
discriminate.’”113  Once the defendant has made his prima facie case “the 
burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for 
challenging . . . [these particular] jurors.”114  The prosecutor’s burden is 
fairly light, as “at this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial va-
lidity of the prosecutor’s explanation.  Unless a discriminatory intent is in-
herent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed 
race neutral.”115  Moreover, “[a]lthough the prosecutor must present a 
comprehensible reason, ‘[t]he second step of this process does not demand 
an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible’; so long as the reason 
is not inherently discriminatory, it suffices.”116  The trial court then “[has] 
the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimi-
nation.”117  This final step involves evaluating “the persuasiveness of the 
justification” proffered by the prosecutor, but “the ultimate burden of per-
suasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the 
opponent of the strike.”118 
The burden shifting motives test employed in Coupe I and Coupe II re-
sembles the Batson test, but with two crucial differences.  First, the chal-
lenged action in Batson implicates a suspect classification, which warrants 
careful scrutiny by the Court.119  In Coupe, there was a striking absence of 
a suspicious trigger, such as ownership of condemned property by another 
 
 110. Id. at 93 (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967)). 
 111. See id. at 93 n.17. 
 112. See id. at 96. 
 113. Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). 
 114. Id. at 97 (alteration to original). 
 115. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
 116. Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006) (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 
767-68 (1995)). 
 117. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. 
 118. Elem, 514 U.S. at 768 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 
(1993)). 
 119. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. 
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private entity.  Rather, in Coupe, the condemned property was to be used 
for a highway that was owned by and open to the public.120  Second, the 
inquiry into motive triggered by this suspect classification in the Batson 
context requires a trial judge to assess the credibility of a single decision-
maker with respect to a decision that was made in open court.121  As a re-
sult, a trial court’s conclusion that a prosecutor acted with improper motive 
constitutes a finding of fact that is accorded substantial deference, since it 
will depend in large upon on the trial judge’s evaluation of credibility.122  
As the Court in Hernandez noted: “In the typical peremptory challenge in-
quiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explana-
tion for a peremptory challenge should be believed.  There will seldom be 
much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be 
the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.”123  Unlike Bat-
son, the motive-based challenge in the eminent domain context will involve 
a deliberation over a lengthy period of time by a multi-member decision-
making body that has determined a particular condemnation is in the public 
interest.  A court reviewing the legislature’s proffered public interest justi-
fication will have little direct evidence of motive and will have to resort to 
circumstantial indications and/or evidence of the individual motive of one 
or more of the members of the decision-making body.124 
The second test, the sufficiency of the plan test, has the advantage of be-
ing most closely aligned with the reasoning of the Kelo decision itself.  The 
majority in Kelo suggested that the existence of an “integrated development 
plan” distinguished the case from one that might be more problematic,125 
and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence relied heavily on the existence of an ex-
tensive planning process to satisfy the concern for pretext.126  Nevertheless, 
this test has the distinct disadvantage of being the most attenuated from the 
 
 120. Coupe II, 242 P.3d at 1154-55 (Haw. 2010). 
 121. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. 
 122. See id. at 98. 
 123. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
 124. See Couple II, 242 P.3d at 1153-57 (assessing the record at great length in an at-
tempt to determine whether illicit motive was behind the county’s decision to condemn pri-
vate property to build a highway overpass). 
 125. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 487 (2005) (“Such a one-to-one transfer 
of property, executed outside the confines of an integrated development plan, is not pre-
sented in this case.”). 
 126. See id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (outlining the aspects of the case that justi-
fied the application of rational-basis review). 
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concerns animating pretext claims in the first place, and therefore of being 
relatively easily satisfied, even if a taking is impermissibly pretextual.127 
The third test, the benefits to the public test, is most similar to the heigh-
tened scrutiny that the Court employs in other contexts where motive is ex-
amined.  The District of Columbia Court of Appeals employed this test in 
Franco v. National Capital Revitalization Corp.128  The Franco court 
viewed a private transfer of condemned land as triggering the benefits to 
the public test.129  Specifically, the Franco court stated: 
We conclude that a reviewing court must focus primarily on benefits the 
public hopes to realize from the proposed taking.  If the property is being 
transferred to another private party, and the benefits to the public are only 
“incidental” or “pretextual,” a “pretext” defense may well succeed.  On 
the other hand, if the record discloses . . . that the taking will serve “an 
overriding public purpose” and that the proposed development “will pro-
vide substantial benefits to the public,” the courts must defer to the judg-
ment of the legislature.130 
The Franco court conceded that “[h]arder cases will lie between these ex-
tremes.”131 
This test is problematic on three levels.  First, as noted above, the trigger 
is so broad that it will encompass virtually all economic development con-
demnations, essentially imposing a heightened level of scrutiny in every 
case.  A broad trigger in general, and this trigger in particular, was express-
ly rejected in Kelo.132  Second, the Supreme Court rejected a very similar 
form of heightened scrutiny in the regulatory takings context in Lingle v. 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,133 just one month before it decided Kelo.  The Kelo 
Court relied on that rejection to eschew the landowner’s claim that the 
Court should require a “reasonable certainty” that public benefits will ac-
crue in eminent domain cases.134  Third, the “test” is really of little use for 
resolving future pretext challenges, as all of the interesting cases are likely 
 
 127. See Daniel B. Kelly, Pretextual Takings: Of Private Developers, Local Govern-
ments, and Impermissible Favoritism, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 173, 189-93 (2009) (explain-
ing the inadequacies of the planning test). 
 128. 930 A.2d 160 (D.C. 2007). 
 129. Id. at 173-75. 
 130. Id. at 173-74 (citations omitted). 
 131. Id. at 174. 
 132. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 485-86 & n.16 (2005). 
 133. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
 134. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488 (“[E]arlier this Term we explained why similar practical con-
cerns (among others) undermined the use of the ‘substantially advances’ formula in our reg-
ulatory takings doctrine. The disadvantages of a heightened form of review are especially 
pronounced in this type of case.”) (citation omitted). 
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to be the “harder cases” that lie in the area in which the Court provided no 
guidance. 
Lingle warrants mention here, because its holding can be viewed in con-
junction with Kelo as foreclosing all attempts to use heightened scrutiny to 
detect pretext in public use challenges.  In Lingle, the Court finally faced 
head-on the problems caused by its seemingly rote recitation of the re-
quirement that a regulation “substantially advance a legitimate public pur-
pose” in many regulatory takings cases.135  Advancing a legitimate public 
purpose was often included in the litany of tests that a regulation had to 
meet, lest the regulation be deemed a taking for which compensation was 
required.136  In Lingle, the Court put to rest any possibility that the phrase 
required heightened scrutiny of legislative determinations under regulatory 
takings challenges.  In particular, the Lingle Court said that a “substantially 
advances” test would unwisely import into takings jurisprudence the 
“means-ends” inquiry best left in the realm of due process.137  According to 
the Court, 
The “substantially advances” formula suggests a means-ends test: It asks, 
in essence, whether a regulation of private property is effective in achiev-
ing some legitimate public purpose.  An inquiry of this nature has some 
logic in the context of a due process challenge, for a regulation that fails 
to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irra-
tional that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause.  But such a test is not a 
valid method of discerning whether private property has been “taken” for 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment.138 
The Lingle Court concluded that not only does the means-ends test not 
make sense in the context of the takings inquiry, but it does not make sense 
in the context of the legislative/judicial relationship.  According to the 
Court, 
Finally, the “substantially advances” formula is not only doctrinally un-
tenable as a takings test-its application as such would also present serious 
practical difficulties.  The Agins formula can be read to demand heigh-
tened means-ends review of virtually any regulation of private property.  
 
 135. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 531-32 (“A quarter century ago, in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 
447 U.S. 255 . . . (1980), the Court declared that government regulation of private property 
‘effects a taking if [such regulation] does not substantially advance legitimate state interests 
. . . .’  Through reiteration in a half dozen or so decisions since Agins, this language has been 
ensconced in our Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence.”) (citation omitted). 
 136. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (“The application of a 
general zoning law to particular property effects a takings if the ordinance does not substan-
tially advance legitimate state interests.”). 
 137. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542. 
 138. Id. (internal citation and emphasis omitted). 
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If so interpreted, it would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast 
array of state and federal regulations-a task for which courts are not well 
suited.  Moreover, it would empower-and might often require-courts to 
substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and 
expert agencies.139 
These two concerns—doctrinal fit and institutional legitimacy—also dic-
tate that the concern for pretext fall out of eminent domain jurisprudence. 
C. Additional Considerations—Pleadings and Remedies 
The theoretical obstacles to importing a pretext consideration into the 
public use inquiry are substantial enough to undermine the wisdom of the 
enterprise.  In addition, practical considerations—less weighty but nonethe-
less instructive—reinforce the prudence of removing motive from the pub-
lic use inquiry altogether.  The difficulty of identifying an appropriate trig-
ger and crafting a workable standard of scrutiny go to the substance of the 
pretext claim; the practical considerations arise at either end of the substan-
tive case—at the pleading and remedy stages. 
As every advocate in federal court knows, the Supreme Court has recent-
ly adopted heightened pleading standards for federal litigation.  In Bell At-
lantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Court reversed the Second Circuit and af-
firmed the district court’s dismissal of an antitrust complaint for failure to 
state a claim.140  Purporting to clarify a longstanding misconstruction of the 
standard set forth fifty years earlier in Conley v. Gibson,141 the Court 
adopted a plausible pleading standard, holding that in order to survive a 
motion to dismiss, an antitrust plaintiff must plead facts sufficient “to state 
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”142  The Court explained that 
its plausibility standard could not be met by mere “labels and conclusions” 
and that a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 
do.”143  Rather, plausible pleadings contain “enough fact to raise a reasona-
ble expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the alleged illegal 
conduct.144 
The pleading standard was raised once more just two years later in Ash-
croft v. Iqbal, when the Supreme Court held that a court reviewing a com-
plaint on a motion to dismiss should begin “by identifying pleadings that, 
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assump-
 
 139. Id. at 544. 
 140. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 141. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 142. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 143. Id. at 555. 
 144. Id. at 556. 
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tion of truth.”145  In that case, Javaid Iqbal alleged that then Attorney Gen-
eral John Ashcroft had violated his constitutional rights by adopting a dis-
criminatory policy that imposed harsh conditions of confinement on Iqbal 
solely on account of his race, religion, and/or national origin.146  This was a 
pure, motive-based discrimination claim.  Yet, the conclusory allegations 
jettisoned from the Court’s consideration of Iqbal’s complaint were those 
allegations that went to the heart of the motive requirement—Iqbal’s alle-
gations that Ashcroft “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously 
agreed to subject [him]” to harsh conditions of confinement “as a matter of 
policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and 
for no legitimate penological interest.”147  The Court characterized these 
allegations as “bare assertions” that “amount to nothing more than a formu-
laic recitation of the elements of a constitutional discrimination claim, 
namely, that petitioners adopted a policy because of, not merely in spite of, 
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”148  As such, the Court said, 
“the allegations are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true.”149 
Eminent domain pretext claims, of course, are also driven by allegations 
of an unconstitutional motive.  Thus, to survive the heightened pleading 
standards of Twombly and Iqbal, a pretext claim—at least one filed in fed-
eral court—must include credible, factually-supported assertions of impro-
per motive.150  This pleading hurdle will be difficult for most pretext plain-
tiffs to overcome. 
Finally, the difficulty of fashioning a remedy for successful pretext 
claims suggests the inaptness of the inquiry.  If a court finds that a pro-
posed use is pretextual, presumably it will enjoin the condemnation.  But if 
the proposed use also serves a valid public purpose, the government, pre-
sumably, would be free to enact the plan calling for the condemnation, this 
time making certain that the proposed use was the primary factor in its de-
cision.  On the other hand, if landowners seek damages for pretextual con-
demnations, the obvious dilemma is that damages for the harm are already 
contemplated in the requirement of just compensation. 
 
 145. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 
 146. Id. at 1944. 
 147. Id. at 1951 (internal quotations omitted). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. For a discussion of the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on public use pretext claims, 
see Carol L. Zeiner, When Kelo Met Twombly-Iqbal:  Implications for Pretext Challenges 
to Eminent Domain, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 201 (2009) (describing the difficulty of satis-
fying the Supreme Court’s new pleading requirements in a complaint alleging a pretextual 
taking). 
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CONCLUSION 
Landowners have long sought to find substantive limitations on govern-
mental powers of eminent domain in the Public Use Clause of the Federal 
Constitution.  The Supreme Court has resisted their entreaties, consistently 
holding that the concept of public use is expansive and that legislative de-
terminations of public purpose should be afforded great deference.  In Kelo, 
however, the Court suggested that this deference would give way to evi-
dence of pretext.  Courts and scholars have responded to this suggestion 
with various strategies for implementing pretext-based judicial review of 
legislative determinations of public use.  Ultimately, however, these strate-
gies flounder, and pretext remains an unwise and unworkable mechanism 
for providing judicial oversight over legislative determinations of public 
use. 
